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THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE. By Immanuel Kant. 
Translated, with an Introduction, by John Ladd. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill. 1965. Pp. 150. $1.45. (Paperback). 
The year 1966 has brought the American people past the mid-
way mark in a decade which has been characterized by fundamental 
and widespread changes in attitudes and reactions to many facets of 
human action and inaction. Incessant grasping for what lies ahead 
or what perhaps seems to be only a short distance ahead has tradi-
tionally been regarded as one of the basic features of the American 
psyche. During certain periods in the past with respect to certain 
spheres of human activity, this characterization of the American 
people has been looked upon by some individuals as more of a myth 
than a reality. These persons insisted that the nation was not pro-
ceeding swiftly enough toward the attainment of certain worthwhile 
objectives. American history is replete with examples of individuals 
who sought to secure basic changes in the pattern of our society 
speedily. Illustrative of efforts in this direction have been the third 
party movements1 and the establishment of communities dedicated 
to the idea of erecting a utopia within our national boundaries. 2 
However, through the 1920's, demands that the nation head off 
in an essentially new direction were, for the most part, rejected. 
Although the century and a half that followed the founding of the 
nation witnessed numerous alterations in American society and the 
laying of portions of the foundation upon which new structures 
could be built, no cleavage with the past was ever so deep and ex-
tensive in our nation's development as that which took place 
after the advent of the Great Depression. The 1960's have reflected 
1. See generally NASH, THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1959). One of the most 
significant third parties in American history was the Populist Party. See HrcKS, THE 
POPULIST REvoLT (1931). Populism has been viewed as a product of environment. 
See POLI.ACK, POPULIST REsPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL .AMERICA (1962). 
2. See generally HERTZLER, THE HlsTORY OF UTOPIAN THOUGHT (1923): KATEB, 
UTOPIA AND ITS ENEMIES (1963). 
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responses to long-restrained pushes and pulls-some of which have 
roots that can be traced back to the first half of the nineteenth 
century-aimed at effecting changes. 
One who is close to events which he undertakes to describe and 
evaluate in terms of their impact on long-term trends is subject to 
the danger of over-emphasizing the significance of such events. He is 
prone to exaggerate the scope of their meaning, for proximity fre-
quently lends an aura of importance to occurrences. A retrospective 
examination, on the other hand, often has an opposite effect. Ac-
knowledging, therefore, that one ·wTiting in 1966 may not success-
fully elude the aforementioned pit-falls, the following conclusions 
nonetheless appear to be warranted by the events which have taken 
place within the last three decades. 
In the course of the past thirty years, thought, as well as conduct, 
has undergone a fundamental shift in emphasis. Desiderata, as well 
as the means used to attain them, have been substantially changed. 
Long respected concepts, oftentimes regarded as basic in nature and 
viewed as determinative of what is "right" and what is "·wrong," 
have been swept away or in some fashion modified. In the face of 
this shifting emphasis, the incidents of old attitudes and ideas 
could not remain untouched; restraints imposed upon various 
sectors of the American society, as well as the protection accorded to 
others, were battered and punctured in the 1930's. By 1966 the 
list of shibboleths either laid to rest or partially discarded included: 
(I) the almost sacrosanct treatment accorded certain activities of the 
business community, on account of which businessmen enjoyed 
the right to determine by and for themselves, within the confines 
of a broad spectrum of right and wrong, how they would conduct 
their commercial and industrial affairs; (2) the admonition that 
laissez-faire and the Jeffersonian approach to government insure the 
attainment of the most desirable form of social, political, and 
economic structure; (3) the idea that individuals should have the 
freedom to pursue their own goals by means of any lawful steps 
believed to be essential, so long as both the benefits of success and 
the undesirable consequences of failure are accepted; (4) the belief 
that the interaction of supply and demand, combined with competi-
tion and the individual's pursuit of his own self-interest, unfettered 
by government intervention, is the appropriate regulator of the 
market place; and (5) the view that, to the extent compulsive powers 
of government must be invoked, the state rather than the federal 
government should be entrusted with the job of determining the 
necessary minimum quantum of governmental activity. Even a pass-
ing observation of our contemporary societal format reveals the ex-
tent to which each of the foregoing ideas has been altered, if not 
actually obliterated. 
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Is there a single attitude, common likeness, similarity of thought, 
or cohesiveness that one can discern after carefully examining the 
manifestations of change that have been provided by the new stan-
dards of propriety? Has there been a fundamental frame of reference 
that has played a determinative role in shaping the pattern of re-
sponses and events that have taken place since the beginning of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal? At first blush one might, out 
of hand, unequivocally answer "no"! To insist that a single factor 
can be utilized by an observer to explain the moving forces underly-
ing the pattern of events of several- decades may be looked upon as 
an indication of the observer's na'ivete. But the more one probes 
what has taken place in the immediate past and is taking place cur-
rently in the United States, the· greater the probability that he will 
experience a sensation of having uncovered evidence that the ques-
tion should be answered with an equivocal "yes." The more one 
digs, the more one scrutinizes, the more he is attracted to, and in 
time perhaps even overwhelmed by, the following proposition: The 
thread of resemblance, the stitching that seems to tie together a 
goodly number of the changes and events that have occurred and are 
taking place, is the growing national interest in the integrity of the 
individual. 
Our society has concurrently grown in size and been subjected 
to shocks caused by the fruits of modem technology. The words 
"regimentation" and "interdependence" have been used to describe 
many aspects of American life in the immediate past as well as in 
the present. Each American is surrounded today by an unprec-
edented number of other human beings, as well as by techniques 
that may be used to measure and control his own conduct.3 Realiz-
ing the significance of these facts, and finding distasteful the ano-
nymity ascribed to some members of our mass society, persons from 
various sectors of society have sought to find new and meaningful 
roles for the individual. 
In this setting, it is not surprising to find that those charged 
with formulating the content of our legal system have manifested 
a growing concern for the welfare of the individual. American law-
makers have joined in the struggle for the survival of the individual 
as an entity, indeed, as a figure of importance, in an impersonal 
milieu. Laws have been changed and continue to be modified as the 
battle for the preservation of the individual is waged.4 The fear 
3. Physical crowding, technology, and their impact on American society were 
the subjects of an address by August Heckscher which was printed and distributed 
by the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., in 1965, in pamphlet form, under the title 
"The Individual and the Mass." 
4. A recently-published work devoted to a study of the expansion of individual 
liberty, under the aegis of the judiciary, since the end of World War ll is KoNvrrz, 
Exl>ANDING Ln!ERTIFS (1966). 
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that a single member of society is for all practical purposes dwarfed 
to insignificance by the growing size of government and its spheres 
of competence, by the capacities of man-made devices and by human 
ingenuity in finding new uses for such mechanisms, has fomented 
vigorous defensive efforts.I• In the course of the conflict, our legal 
system has been seized as a shield as well as an offensive weapon 
to hold at bay and to ward off those forces that have tended to 
decimate the integrity of the individual. Some of the responses of 
those who breathe life into our law can be found in the treatment of 
indigents, the concern for the ratio of voters to representatives in the 
nation's legislative bodies, the manner in which members of 
minority groups are dealt with, and the restraints imposed upon 
individuals and particular groups. 
The new translation of Immanuel Kant's The Metaphysical 
Elements of Justice, and the accompanying forty-eight page intro-
duction-each the work of John Ladd, Professor of Philosophy at 
Brown University--offer a refreshing and welcome beacon for those 
who are searching for an answer to the question: "What standard 
of right and wrong should a people employ in order to determine 
whether its body of court-enforced norms is desirable?"6 The suc-
cinctly written and lucidly presented introduction, and the captivat-
ing and clearly prepared translation permit one to indulge joyously 
in pondering Kant's proposals relating to the prime objectives of 
a country's legal system. Kant's work, published in its original 
form approximately a century and a half ago, has an almost unbe-
lievable relevancy to the current era: the philosophy of law is keyed 
to the individual human being, his freedom and his personal integ-
rity; the role of the state is envisaged as that of a guardian-the 
protector of individual freedom. 
Immanual Kant was born in East Prussia in 1724. He died in 
1804, after a life in which he had not strayed far from his place of 
birth. This man, whose life has been depicted as an "ivory tower" 
prototype, not only exerted a significant influence on the philo-
sophical thought of his day, but also has affected succeeding genera-
tions of philosophers.7 His insight, ability to formulate general prin-
5. At its 1966 Annual Meeting, the American Bar Association established a Sec-
tion on "Individual Rights and Responsibilities." Members of this division have 
the task of studying and suggesting to the Association the position it should take on 
socio-legal issues, For the history and composition of the new body, see N.Y. Times, 
August 9, 1966, pp. 1, 26. 
6. Prior to the appearance of Professor Ladd's book, a translation by William 
Hastie, published in 1887, was the only widely-circulated English version of Kant's 
work devoted to his philosophy of law. Hastie's work is entitled The Philosophy of 
Law, An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence. 
7. The part Kant played in the evolution of German thought is discussed in 
BOSSENBROOK, THE GERMAN MIND 227-35 (1961). Kant, his ideas, and their influence 
are prC!ellted in an interesting fashion in DILL, GERMANY 59-60 (1961). 
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ciples, and capacity to communicate ideas have earned him a lasting 
place in the history of philosophy.8 
Kant's philosophy has been described as realistic, formal, ratio-
nal, idealistic and transcendental: realistic, in the sense that he 
eschewed the idea that human passions and sentiment could be 
beneficially utilized to decide whether a particular standard of 
conduct was right or wrong; formal, in that he insisted that a 
particular procedure had to be followed if one were to arrive at a 
correct conclusion, placing great stress on the use of logic; rational, 
in that he extolled the power of human beings to reason, assuming 
that all men possess the ability to act in a rational fashion and to 
guide themselves exclusively by reason; idealistic, since at the core 
of his philosophy is respect for individual freedom, the shunning 
of dogma, and the rejection of unwarranted conformity and regi-
mentation; transcendental, in that he looked for ends and means 
that were independent of man's environment and human experi-
ence, insisting that standards of right and wrong had universal 
applicability. 
In this volume Kant did not undertake to set forth a desirable, 
detailed, in-toto set of laws for a nation. Instead, he tried to convey 
to the reader his thinking pertaining to the general philosophical 
base upon which the legal system of a civilized society should be 
structured. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice does not embody 
an enumeration of specifics. It contains Kant's personal attitude 
toward the law and his plea for its acceptance by society. Kant's 
presentation leaves the concrete application of his directives to those 
persons who are obligated to rule upon the apportionment of rights 
and duties between individuals and between an individual and 
the state. 
The crux of Kant's philosophy is the antithesis of what many 
individuals now consider to be an essential element of a meaningful 
approach to the "is" as well as the "ought" of the law. Responsive-
ness to environment has been hailed by numerous proponents of 
change as the correct base upon which to build a nation's legal 
system. Kant argued against this proposition, labelling his philos-
ophy of law "metaphysical." Metaphysical, in the Kantian sense, is 
a non-scientific and non-empirical approach to law. According to 
Kant, government-enforced norms should not reflect the results of 
experiments and inquiries which probe man or his environment. 
Rather, such norms should be determined on an a priori basis, their 
content to be the product of man's rational, disinterested, practical, 
pure reasoning processes. Kant vehemently attacked the idea that 
human conduct should be shaped by environment, observations and 
conclusions based on past or present events, man's passions or his 
8. For a consideration of Kant's philosophy and its relationship to current-day 
attitudes toward freedom, see MULI..ER, FREEDOM IN nm MODERN WORLD (1966). 
December 1966] Recent Books 411 
predispositions. He boldly proclaimed that impersonal reason must 
be the source of the demands formulated and imposed by the law-
makers. Kant refused to accept the premise that the best way to test 
the validity of a legal standard is to invoke the scientific method. 
Resorting to attempts to verify the propriety of an enforceable 
standard of human conduct by studying its effect on man and 
society was foreign to Kant's philosophy.9 He insisted that the cor-
rectness of a rule of law should be determined by relying solely 
upon reason. 
In Kant's opinion, the fundamental frame of reference of all law 
should be the protection and the promotion of individual freedom. 
One of the most important underpinnings of his thinking was his 
insistence upon respect for the autonomy of the individual. No 
man, according to Kant, should be used as a tool to secure the at-
tainment of certain objectives. The freedom of each individual, 
Kant urged, was to be viewed as the objective of the law. Individual 
freedom was therefore the focal point of Kant's test of whether a 
legal principle was good or bad; if it advanced individual freedom, 
it was good, whereas if it hampered the exercise of individual 
freedom, it was bad. 
It is especially interesting to note that although Kant regarded 
the advancement of freedom as the ultimate goal of law, he did 
not advocate the per se elimination of the powers of the state. Here, 
Kant's attitude was diametrically opposite to that manifested by 
those who, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were en-
raptured by and glorified man's status in a primitive and stateless 
society.1° Kant stated that man's freedom could not be assured, 
absent the existence of an organized state government. He believed 
that freedom was not self-enforcing. In a state of nature, devoid of 
government, man could readily be denied his freedom, for might 
was the determining factor. Kant espoused the proposition that the 
compulsive powers of the state could, and should, be invoked to 
shield and advance individual freedom. 
Kant's insistence upon individual freedom, however, did not 
mean that he argued in favor of unrestricted freedom for each and 
every person to do precisely as he desired. Rather, Kant drew the 
9. Compare Kant's attitude with that of the Supreme Court contained in Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) wherein the Court rejected the "separate-
but-equal doctrine" which had previously been relied upon as a basis to sustain 
segregation. Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote: "We must consider public education in 
the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools 
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 492-93. In sup-
porting footnotes, the Court cited reports based on studies of the impact of segrega-
tion on individuals. Id. at 494-95 nn. 10, 11. 
10. John Locke (1632-1704) was one of the leading political theorists who glorified 
the individual. He differed from Kant in that he looked to the individual, rather 
than the state, for the protection of freedom. Two of Locke's treaties were reprinted 
in 1924 under the title Of Civil Government. 
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line between proper restraint and valued freedom as follows: One 
man's freedom was circumscribed by boundaries that surrounded· 
the outermost limits of another man's freedom.11 A man was not 
free to act in a manner that would infringe upon the breadth of 
permissible freedom of another individual.12 According to Kant, 
man's a priori reasoning should fashion the norms essential to secure 
and promote individual freedom, and the powers of the state could 
then be utilized to put them into effect. 
Kant's belief that man is capable of devising a suitable system 
of law was consistent with his personal appraisal of human beings. 
He believed that human beings are socially-oriented, good and 
ethical. These traits, he contended, permit men to be the creator 
of desirable legal standards. Such features, according to Kant, are 
possessed by all human beings, and from this premise followed his 
contention that there are certain universal rules that the legal 
systems of all nations must enforce. Kant's universality of law con-
cept is reminiscent of the natural law philosophy.13 However, un-
like many proponents of natural law, Kant, as we have seen, main-
tained that man must rely upon reason, rather than looking to a 
Supreme Being or environment in devising state-enforced norms.14 
Infliction of punishment, according to Kant, is the only type of 
action that society, through its legal system, might properly take 
against one convicted of a crime. He condemned the view that in-
dividuals who offend the penal law should, under certain cir-
cumstances, be taken under the beneficent and protective wings of 
the state with a view toward their rehabilitation. Kant's refusal 
to accept the proposition that the criminal law can be used as a 
means to reconstruct those who violated its commands and trans-
form them into worthwhile members of society re.fleets his lack of 
interest in environmental factors. He regarded the criminal as an 
atypical human being. To dole out punishment to one who breaks 
one or more of society's mandates, as far as Kant was concerned, 
is rational. He regarded any other use of the criminal law as 
inappropriate. 111 
11. Kant wrote of the need for an accommodation between freedom and state 
power. He stated that if men were to enjoy freedom it was necessary that these two 
competing factors co-exist in "harmony" with one another. See generally .AR.'IZ, 
REACTION AND REVOLUTION 75-76 (1934). 
12. The depth of attention Kant paid to the idea of freedom under law, rather 
than freedom without state-imposed restraints, is dealt with in CAmn, THE CRinCAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT 171, 254 (1909), 
13. For an examination of natural law and freedom, see MARITAIN, THE RlcH'IS 
OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW (Anson transl. 1943). 
14. The influence of theology on natural law is examined in RAMSEY, NINE MODERN 
MORALISTS (1962). 
15. Criminal law and the demands of environmental factors, as well as the use 
of knowledge amassed and theories formulated by members of other disciplines are 
considered in HALL, STUDIES IN JURISl'RUDENCB AND CRIMINAL Tm:ORY (1958). See 
also MANNHEIM, Cru:MINAL JumCB AND SoCIAL RECONSTRUCITON (1946) for a discussion 
of the rehabilitation approach to the treatment of criminals. 
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Kant was, in a W?,-y, a polemicist. He examined areas of human 
activity which he believed were in need of consideration and then 
proceeded to construct his proposals of how particular problems 
should be handled. He immersed himself in a study of the "ought" 
of the law. For those who have devoted or are now devoting some 
portion of their time to a consideration of such matters as civil 
rights and the liberties of the individual, this volume will prove 
to be especially fascinating reading. 
Many persons have been attracted to the philosophy that the 
promotion of individual freedom should be the prime objective of 
all national legal systems as well as of international law.16 However, 
there is a growing awareness that unrestricted freedom may at times 
be as detrimental to human freedom as excessive restraints imposed 
by the state. Kant, in his Metaphysical Elements, insisted that in-
dividuals are obliged to obey the laws of the state. This does not 
mean that Kant favored a dictatorial state. His position here is con-
sistent with his premise that it is the state which, by using its 
coercive powers, can guarantee individual freedom. Absent enforce-
able laws individuals would be denied freedom. Kant's contention 
that some restraints upon freedom are essential for freedom touches 
upon one of the most difficult problems facing our legal system 
today-civil disobedience and lawlessness carried on under the 
banner of freedom.17 
16. An individual's right to life, liberty and security of his person are among the 
rights included in the International Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R.Ec. 
!Id Sess., Res. No. 217, at 71 (A/810) (1948). The Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed November 4, 1950, by the member 
states of the Council of Europe, guaranteed individual liberty to subjects of each 
of the states. The text of the Convention is contained in EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, DOCUMENTS AND DECISIONS 1955-1956-1957 2-91 (1959). See Tucker, Has 
The Individual Become The Subject of International Law?, !14 U. CINC. L. REv. !141 
(1965). 
17. Several of the decisions handed down during the 1965-1966 term of the 
Supreme Court emphasize the Court's appreciation of the urgency that it keep a 
"sense of balance" when it is called upon to determine individual rights. One per-
son's rights, as well as the rights of other individuals, must be accorded recognition 
simultaneously. In Miranda v. Arizona, !184 U.S. 4!16 (1966), Mr. Chief Justice Warren 
wrote: "The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts 
of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent 
with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime." Id. at 4!19, In 
Miranda the Court ruled that a confession made by a defendant while in the cus-
tody of the police could not be used in a state criminal proceeding unless he had 
been warned, prior to making the confession, that he had a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he might make could thereafter be used as evidence against him 
and that he had the right to have an attorney at his side, either one he retained 
or one who was appointed, to advise him. The Court, in support of its result, cited 
the report of the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights. In Malloy v. Hogan, !178 U.S. 1 
(1964), the Court held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited the states from 
compelling an individual to incriminate himself. The Court's current concern for 
the rights of individuals was reflected in its holding in Sheppard v. Maxwell !184 
U.S. llll!I (1966) wherein a state court criminal conviction was reversed on the ground 
that the defendant could not have had a fair trial due to the large amount of 
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Professor Ladd's excellent introduction lays a fine groundwork 
for an appreciation of Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice. 
Ladd not only touches upon major points of Kant's thinking, but 
also explains numerous terms employed by this giant of philosophy. 
The explanations facilitate one's reading of Kant; they make the 
perusal of this work more enjoyable than it might otherwise be, 
since Kant used many terms which he himself formulated to com-
municate his thoughts to his audience. 
The legal philosophy buff will :find irresistable the :fine glossary 
of Kant's German terms, with their English translations, which is 
contained in this book. This reviewer happily greeted Kant's "Sup-
plemental Explanations of the Metaphysical Elements of Justice," 
(immediately preceding the glossary), which is Kant's response to 
a review of The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. In his reply to 
the review, Kant expounded upon some of his thoughts which the 
reviewer contended were not clearly presented or with which the 
reviewer took issue. 
This volume is well-ordered, extensively footnoted and attrac-
tively arranged. College students, law students, lawyers, law pro-
fessors and all persons who wish to add to their storehouse of knowl-
edge or re-evaluate their personal ideas about freedom and law will 
heartily welcome this presentation of the thoughts of one of the 
foremost philosophers of Western Civilization. Professor Ladd's 
efforts and their product should prove to be extremely satisfying 
and valuable reading. 
Edwin W. Tucker, 
Associate Professor of 
Business Administration, 
The University of Connecticut 
adverse publicity which appeared in the newspapers prior to and during the course 
or his trial. However, concern for society's interests outweighed the right of the 
individual in the eyes of the majority of the Court in Ginzburg v, United States, 
383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg the Court sustained the conviction of the defendant 
who had been accused of violating the Federal obscenity statute, In the Court's 
opinion the defendant had engaged in "commercial exploitation of erotica solely 
for the sake of their prurient appeal" and therefore had gone beyond the scope of 
protection guaranteed by the first amendment. Id. at 466. For a discussion of the need 
to balance responsibility of the individual and the freedom to publish, see Epstein, 
The Obscenity Business, The Atlantic, Aug. 1966, pp. 56-60. 
